April, 1933

RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE
UNDER TARIFF

LAw-CusToMS

DUTIES--REQUISITES

OF A HEARING

ACT OF 1922-A public hearing was given by the Tariff Com-

mission created under the Act of 1922 ' to determine whether the duty on
sodium nitrite imports should be increased. Information as to costs of production submitted by an American manufacturer who requested secrecy was not disclosed at the request of the petitioner, a foreign pr6ducer, who also refused to
give any data upon this point; nor was he allowed to cross-examine the Commission's investigators with respect to these matters. The Commission recommended that the duty be increased, and the President issued a proclamation to
that effect. Petitioner protested payment of duties under the new schedule, on
the ground that no proper hearing had been given. Held, that the hearing was
adequate.2 Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 53 Sup. Ct. 350

(1933).
The adequacy of an administrative hearing is usually determined by the
purpose for which it is given.3 If it adjudicates individual rights, 4 "due process"
requires that a full disclosure of all testimony be made, so as to give the other
side an opportunity to offer countervailing evidence. 5 Similarly, cross-examination should be permitted for the purpose of impeaching opposing testimony. 6
But if the hearing is in furtherance of legislation, whether it consists of an enactment by the legislature itself, or of regulations laid down by an administrative
body to whom the function has been delegated, its inadequacy cannot be ques142 STAT. 858 § 315 (1922) ; i U. S. C. A. § 156 (1928). Under this Act the President
of the United States is given authority to increase or decrease the rates of duty specified in
the Act if he finds upon investigation that increase or decrease is necessary in order to
equalize the difference in the cost of production in the United States and elsewhere. The
President is not to make any proclamation, however, until an investigation to assist the
President has been made by the United States Tariff Commission which shall give "reasonable public notice of its hearings and shall give reasonable opportunity to parties interested
to be present, to produce evidence, and to be heard."
2 The Court, per Cardozo, J., gave the following reasons why such hearing was within
the legislative intent of Congress:
I. Since the hearings before the Congressional Committee did not give the parties concerned, as a matter of right, the opportunity to cross-examine and refute the testimony submitted, it is to be inferred that this duty to determine tariff rates, having been delegated to an
administrative body, does not involve a more complete hearing.
2. The history of the statute as it passed through the two Houses of Congress evidences
the intent to require no different a hearing than the one received before the Congressional
Committee.
3. It is an inference from several years of silence that Congress has acquiesced in the
administrative practice of not revealing such information.
'"To
determine the adequacy of a particular hearing granted by an administrative
tribunal, the desirability of protecting, by procedural safeguards, the private parties concerned is balanced against the desirability of promoting the efficiency of government by allowing its officers ample freedom in selecting the manner of performing their public functions."
Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 878.
""What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the former affects the rights
of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding, before the legal
position of any particular individual will be definitely touched by it; while adjudication
operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity." DIcKINsON, ADMINIsTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAw (1927) 21.

'Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup.
Ct. 185 (1913) ; Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 878, 884; Albertsworth, Judicial Review
of Administrative Action by the Federal Suprene Court (1921) 35 HARv. L. REv. 127, 128.
' Garfield v. United States, 32 App. D. C. 153 (19o8) ; Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F. (2d)
934 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) ; Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co.,
266 Ill. 567, lO7 N. E. 841 (1915) ; Note (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. RxV. 878, 884.
(764)
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tioned, since no hearing at all need be given.' The raising or lowering of tariff
duties, inasmuch as it applies to all persons alike, is a purely legislative function.,
On technical constitutional grounds, therefore, the instant decision is correct, but
the statutory provision so construed would seem to be at variance with the legislative policy behind the Act of 1922, which was, undoubtedly, to substitute a more
scientific method of determining proper rates than could be secured by means
of the necessarily inadequate hearings held by Congressional committees. It is
unreasonable to assume that Congress, by delegating this important function to
a board of experts, intended to defeat its main objective by not requiring that
the "public hearing" given shall be full and complete, and the evidence subject to
refutation. It might be contended that since Congress is really conferring a
bounty upon foreign producers by granting them the general privilege of importation, no complaints concerning the inadequacy of the hearing were intended to
be entertained." But such benefit is at least neutralized, if not outweighed, by
the benefit conferred upon the American producer by the existence of a tariff,
since it enables him to compete on favorable terms with foreign goods. It would
seem to be unjustifiable favoritism not to compel him to disclose so-called "trade
secrets", especially in view of the well-known fact that protective tariffs do not
increase the national revenue, but redound only to the personal advantage of
the individual manufacturer. It is only just to impose upon him, as a very slight
return for the tremendous competitive advantage conferred, the reasonable burden of affirmatively showing cause why the duty on a particular import should
be increased. However, the decision in the instant case might perhaps be supported on the ground that the petitioner's refusal to disclose any facts relating
to its own business thereby precluded it from insisting on a similar disclosure
by others.' 0

CONFLICT OF LAWS-POWER OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATOR TO SUE UNDER
FOREIGN DEATH STATUTE FOR FOREIGN TORT 'HEN DISQUALIFIED BY LOCAL
DEATH STATUTE FOR LOCAL TORT-A Pennsylvania administrator sued in Penn-

' Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U. S. 441,

36 Sup. Ct. 141 (1915) ; Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 239, 10 Sup. Ct. 533
(i8go) ; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 6 Sup. Ct. 57 (1885).

While the fixing of public utility rates has been held legislative for some purposes, Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 21O, 29 Sup. Ct. 67 (i9oS), nevertheless, the cases consistently hold that opportunity to cross-examine and refute opposing evidence is a necessary
requisite of an adequate hearing. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., supra note 5. A possible explanation may be that rate-fixing also has some judicial
aspects. Thus, ". . . if we examine rate-fixing from the standpoint of the general applicability of the resulting rate to an indefinite number of future cases as a class, we observe the
significant peculiarity that, while the rate applies indifferently, indeed, as against all future
shippers, it applies only to the particular carrier or carriers who were parties to the hearing
and other proceedings before the commission, and for whom, as the outcome of those proceedings, the rate is prescribed. From the standpoint of shippers, therefore, thd rate may
no doubt be regarded as legislation, but from the standpoint of the carriers it seems quite as
truly adjudication." DICKINSON~, op. cit. sipra note 4, at I8.
Principal case at 354.
'There is a strong tendency not to disturb the finding of the administrative tribunal
where some gratuity or privilege is sought from the government. Public Clearing House v.
Coyne, 194 U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904) (Postal Department determination) ; United
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (I9O5)' (immigration) ; United States ex
rel. Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, Igo U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 698 (19o3) (public land
grant).

See also DICKINSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at 56.

The greatest reluctance of the

courts to disturb administrative findings is in the collection of public revenue, since it involves the "vital power of government to provide means for its own existence." DICKINSON,
op. cit. supranote 4, at 58. Hilton v. Merrit, 1io U. S. 97, 3 Sup. Ct. 548 (1884) ; Kentucky
Railroad Tax Cases, supra note 6; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404, I8 Sup. Ct. 925 (1897).
" See principal case at 361.
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sylvania for decedent's death, caused in New York by defendant's wrongful act.
Under the New York code,' the administrator appointed in New York or any
other state may sue for wrongful death, and the damages recovered are for the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin. The Pennsylvania
statute 2 provides that actions for wrongful death shall be brought by the surviving spouse, children or parents. Held, that the administrator was the proper
party plaintiff. Dickinson v. Jones et al., 163 Atl. 516 (Pa. 1932).
A foreign administrator may sue in Pennsylvania if the lex loci directs that
actions for wrongful death shall be brought by the administrator. But in the
present case, the plaintiff is a Pennsylvania administrator, and had the tort been
committed in Pennsylvania, he would not have been allowed to maintain the action. 4 This, and the fact that the present Pennsylvania statute repealed that
part of an earlier act ' which allowed the administrator to sue, formed the basis
of defendant's contention that to allow the administrator to maintain the action,
would be contrary to Pennsylvania policy. Under this earlier Pennsylvania act,
were available for the dehowever, the damages recovered by the administrator
cedent's creditors in preference to his dependents.6 It was this feature that the
repeal sought to remedy 7 and since the present plaintiff is suing, not in his ordinary capacity as administrator, but as trustee for those beneficially interested
under the New York statute, the defendant's policy argument fails. However,
the ultimate beneficiaries are the same under the statutes both of New York and
Pennsylvania. Might it not be, then, that the question of who shall bring the
suit is a procedural one and therefore to be governed by the lex fori? It has
9
been so held." The majority opinion and that of the court in the instant case,
by
solely
exists
death
for
wrongful
of
action
right
however, is that since the
the
virtue of the statute of the locus, that right is vested in the person whom
10
It is
statute directs to bring the suit, and that, therefore, he alone can suedifficult to see why this should be so, merely because the same statute that creates the substantive rights says who is to enforce those rights, and not so in cases
where a substantive common law right is given a statutory means of enforcement,
as, for example, a "real party in interest statute", where the usual rule is that
the assignor must sue as a plaintiff-to-use, even though the place of the assignment has a real party in interest statute."- However that may be, the distinction
between remedial matter and substance is so tenuous, perhaps arbitrary, in these
cases that the literal interpretation given the death statutes is fortunate for its
certainty.
'NEW YORK DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (I92I) §§ 130, 133.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 12, §§ 16o2, 16o3.
Usher v. West Jersey R. C., 126 Pa. 206, 17 AtI. 579 (1899) ; Roberts, Administrator, v.
Freihofer Baking Co., 283 Pa. 573, 129 At. 574 (1925).

' Brooks, Administrator, v. Borough of Danville, 95 Pa. I58 (i88o).
5

PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12, § 16ox.

I See Brooks v. Borough of Danville, supra note 4, at 165.
7 Brooks v. Borough of Danville, supra note 4, at i65.
' Bussey v. Charleston W. & C. R. Co., 73 S. C. 215, 53 S. E. I65 (19o6) ; cf. Stewart v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 168 U. S. 445, 18 Sup. Ct. 105 (1897). Contra: CONFLICT OF LAWS
REsTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) §§ 430, 432. The comment to § 432 says: "If the death
statute of the state of wrong names a particular representative to sue, such as the representative appointed in the state of injury or at the domicile of the injured person, he and he only
can sue in any state."

90At 5i8.
' Western & A. R. Co. v. Strong, 52 Ga. 461 (1874); McGinnis v.; Missouri Car and
Foundry Co., 174 Mo. 225, 73 S. W. 586 (I9O3) ; Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., supra note 3;

other authorities collected in TIFFANY, DEATHE BY WRONGFUL Act (2d ed. 1913) 461.
" Roosa v. Crist, 17 Ill. 450 (1856) : Foss v. Nutting, 14 Gray 484 (Mass. 186o) ; see
GooDRIcE, CONFLct OF LAWS (1927) 159, i60. It is interesting to note that, consistent with
its doctrine in the present case, the Pennsylvania Court has, contrary to most courts, inter-

preted the New York real party in interest statute as transferring legal title to the assignee
at the time of the assignment, and has allowed the assignee to sue in his own name, though
the rule of the forum is that the assignor must be joined. Levy v. Levy, 78 Pa. 5o7 (1875).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS-PRIORITY OF FOREIGN MECHANIC'S LIEN OVER INTEREST OF CONDITIONAL VENDOR IN PROPERTY TAKEN TO FOREIGN STATE-

Delivery of an automobile was made to a vendee in the state of New York under
a contract of conditional sale made and recorded in that state. The contract provided that the buyer should not remove the automobile from New York State
without the written consent of the seller. The buyer drove the car to Maryland
where he delivered it to the defendant's assignor, a garageman, to make necessary repairs. The plaintiff in an action of replevin claimed title under the conditional sales contract. The defense was based on a statutory lien accorded in
Maryland to garagemen. Held, that the contention of defendant was correct
since regardless of the lex loci contractus the statutory lien of the forum governed. Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 163 Atl. 81o (Md. 1933).
Generally a chattel is subject to the law of the jurisdiction in which it is
located,' but such a rule must be qualified as to two situations, (I) when the
chattel is bronght there either with, and (2) without the consent of an owner
who has retained an interest in the property by way of a conditional sale or
chattel mortgage. When taken into another state without the consent of such
vendor or mortgagee, the almost universal rule 2 is that the interest which the
owner obtained under the law of the state where the contract was made will be
recognized and enforced.3 This rule, however, does not apply to the case of
rights of persons in the jurisdiction to which the chattel is brought who have
done acts for the preservation of the property. 4 A more controversial question
arises when the property is taken to another state with the consent of the owner.
In the instant case the court properly said that the automobile was driven to Maryland as though with the consent of the vendor due to the nature of the property
and the temporary character of the removal.' Many courts on various theories
have decided that the interest of the non-resident conditional vendor in such a
situation becomes subject to attachment by creditors in the second state or to
other similar claims arising there.6 Probably the strongest argument for this
view is that by consenting to the removal of the chattel, the vendor thereby
submits his property to the operation of that foreign law.7 Under this theory
the decision of the principal case would follow a fortiori as being included in the
general proposition stated. Other courts reach an opposite result by refusing to

IFrick v. Pennsylvania,

268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925) ; CONFLT OF LAWS RE§ 51.
"The erroneous view of a few states is that irrespective of the non-consent of the conditional vendor, this interest is lost by a transaction in a foreignj state to which the vendee
takes the property. Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 2oI Pac. 887 (I92I) ; Willys-Overland
Co. v. Chapman, 206 S. W. 978 (Tex. 1918).
'Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199 (188o) ; Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 2o5 Ky. 146, 265 S. W.
STATEMENT

(Am. L. INST.

1930)

498 (1924) ; Rodecker v. Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364 (1923) ; GooDRIcH, CONFLICT
350; Beale, Jurisdiction Over Title of Absent Owner in a Chattel (1927)
OF LAWs (1927)
40 HARv. L. REV. 805.
4
CONFICT OF LAWs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. INST. 1930) § 52; Willys-Overland Co. v.
Evans, 1O4 Kan. 632, i8o Pac. 235 (1919) ; Beale, supra note 3; Mack v. The Degraff &

Roberts Quarries, 57 Ohio St. 463, 49 N. E. 697 (1898). See also Walworth v. Harris, 129
U. S. 355, 9 Sup. Ct. 340 (1888) ; Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U. S. 289, 29& (1809). It is still an
open question whether this rule would apply to labor performed which did not preserve but
rather improved the chattel.
Principal case, at 814. In re Bowman, 36 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 2d, i929) ; Hare &
Chase v. Tomkinson, 129 At. 396 (N. J. 1Q25).
'Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 3o7 (U. S. 1866) ; Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive
Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876) (fraud on creditors) ; Potter Mfg. Co. v. Arthur, 22o Fed. 843
(C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; Corbett v. Riddle, 2o9 Fed. 811 (C. C. A. 4th, 1913) ; Beggs & Co. v.
Bartels, 73 Conn. 132, 46 Atl. 874 (1oo) (parties intended to be governed by the law of the
place to which it was contemplated the chattel would be brought) ; Du Pont de Nemours Co.
v. Jones, 2oo Fed. 638 (S. D. Ohio, 1912) ; CONF IcT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. INST.
1930) §§ 297, 298.

"Green v. Van Buskirk; Potter Mfg. Co. v. Arthur, both supra note 6.
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give the law of a state foreign to the vendor extra-territorial control over his
rights existing in another state." Even under this view, however, it seems reasonable and fair to uphold a lien based on acts which by their nature actually
preserve the value of the security of the conditional vendor." Under any theory,
therefore, that a court may happen to adopt the result of the case under consideration would seem to be justified.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-DUE

PROCESS-VALIDITY OF STATUTE PROHIBIT-

ING PRIVATE MOTOR CARRIER FROM USING STATE HIGHWAYS WITHOUT CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY-A Montana statute pro-

hibited private motor carriers from operating on state highways without having
first obtained from the board of railroad commissioners a certificate that public
convenience and necessity required such operation. Plaintiff, a private contract
carrier, was refused a certificate by the board, and ordered to cease operating
his trucks, on the ground that public convenience and necessity did not require
the proposed services. The act was attacked as in violation of due process in an
action to restrain the board from enforcing its order. Held, that the statute
was constitutional.' Barney v. Board of Railroad Coinrs, 17 Pac. (2d) 82
(Mont. 1932).
The statute held valid in the instant case, while purporting to regulate the
use of highways,' had no apparent effect other than to regulate competition,
especially with railroads, 3 as the issuing or refusal of the certificate was made
8
Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Hull, 239 Fed. 26 (C. C. A. Ist, 1916) ; Clyde Iron Works
v. Frerichs, 2o3 Fed. 637 (C. C. A. 5th, 1913) ; Barrett v. Kelly, 66 Vt. 515, 29 At. 8og
(1894) ; Drew v. Smith, 59 Me. 393 (1871) ; Cleveland Machine Works v. Lang, 67 N. H.
348, 31 Atl. 2o (1892) ; Mershon v. Moors, 76 Wis. 502, 45 N. W. 95 (189o) (intention to
be governed by the law where the contract was made). Though there is authority contra,
the better rule is that such a provision as § 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act could
require the foreign vendor to record the contract under penalty of forfeiture of his interest.
But in the absence of a statute expressly creating such a duty, recording acts are generally
held to apply only to local sales. Fry Bros. v. Theobold, Rodecker v. Jannah, both supra
note 3.
9
Willys-Overland Co. v. Evans, supra note 4; Beale, supra note 3; CONFLICT OF LAWs

RESTATEmENT (Am. L. INST. 1930) §§ 299, 494.

This opinion was substituted for a former one which had held the statute invalid. The
Court allowed a rehearing and in the substituted opinion state that they were influenced by
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Stephenson v. Binford, 53 Sup. Ct. 18I
(1932), which was decided after the first opinion had been given.
- Its responsibility for the safety of the public confers upon the state the power to regulate its public highways. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 6o, 35 Sup. Ct. 140 (1915) ;
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 16o, 37 Sup. Ct. 30 (1916). The primary use of highways
being for non-commercial purposes, it is well grounded in our constitutional law that the
legislature may prohibit or condition their use for the purpose of gain. Packard v. Banton,
264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924) ; Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U. S.
335, 52 Sup. Ct. 144 (1932). But of course no condition imposed by the legislature may ever
involve the surrender of constitutional rights. Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 218 U. S. 56, 3o
Sup. Ct. 232 (igio) ; Terral v. Burke Const. Co., 257 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. I88 (1932).
'The Act made no provisions regarding number of trucks, size, speed, etc. The Board
was authorized to take the following into consideration in passing upon a carrier's application: "The board shall give reasonable consideration to the transportation service being
furnished, or that will be furnished by any railroad, or other existing transportation agency,
and shall give due consideration to the likelihood of the proposed service being permanent,
and continuous throughout twelve (12) months of the year and the effect which such proposed transportation service may have upon other forms of transportation service which are
essential and indispensable to the communities to be affected by such proposed transportation
service or that might be affected thereby." MONT. LAWS (1931) c. 184, § Ii. If this were
not in fact a valid use of the right to regulate highways, and private carriers not adjudged
to be impressed with a public interest, then the statute was conceded to be contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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dependent upon the adequacy of existing service. Several statutes of other
states containing the same provisions, but in addition, really regulating the use
of highways, have recently been upheld. 4 The United States Supreme Court
has very recently approved such a statute enacted by Texas, 5 justifying the
provision assailed in the instant case by calling it "a means to the legitimate end
of conserving the highways," although the Court had previously held that the
requirement of a certificate of necessity was not a highway regulation.6 The
Supreme Court had also held invalid a California statute substantially similar
to the Texas statute.7 The Court distinguished the statutes, in that the California
Supreme Court had interpreted their statute not to be a regulation of the use of
the highways, but a regulation of competition. Regardless of the latter interpretation, the effect of the statutes was identical, yet one was held constitutional,
the other not. Seemingly, the Court now realizes that the exigencies of the
present economic status of the railroads require regulation of competition
between all carriers, public or private, or our entire transportation structure will
fall. Today, a most casual study of transportation needs makes clear that
private carriers are so closely connected with common carriers that the public is vitally interested in their regulation. However, having recently held
that a state could not prevent disastrous competition in a private business
by requiring a state license, because the business was not impressed with a
"public interest", s the Supreme Court expressly refused to say that a private
carrier is engaged in a business impressed with a "public interest". Instead, the
Court was obliged to allow regulation only under the guise of a means which had
no real or substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ELECTIONS-POWER OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF POLITICAL PARTY TO EXCLUDE- NEGRO FROM PRIMARY ELECTION-A

city

executive committee of the Democratic Party passed a resolution excluding
negroes from the municipal primary election. The plaintiff, so excluded, claims
a violation of his constitutional rights. Held, that because it was not shown
that the committee was authorized so to act by any state statute, the court would
assume it was exercising that power to determine membership inherent in every
private organization, and that, therefore, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not apply. Drake v. Executive Committee of the Democratic Party,
U. S. Daily, Jan. 20, 1933, at 2024 (S. D. Tex.).

The United States Supreme Court has held that a statute which excludes
negroes from a primary election violates the Fourteenth Amendment in that
it discriminates on the basis of color and denies equal protection of the law.1

I Schwartzman Service, Inc. v. Stahl, 6o F. (2d) 1034 (W. D. Mo. 1932) ; Stephenson v.
Binford, supra note I; Riley v. Lawson, 143 So. 61g (Fla. 1932); Rutledge Co-Op. Association v. Baughman, 153 Md. 297, 138 Atl. 29 (1927).
Stephenson v. Binford, supra note x.
'In Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307, 315, 45. Sup. Ct. 324, 326 (925), Mr. Justice
Brandeis said in regard to such certificates: "Its primary purpose is not regulation with a
view to safety or conservation of the highways, but the prohibition of competition. It determines, not the manner of use, but the persons by whom the highways may be used. It
prohibits such use to some persons, while permitting it to others for the same purpose and in
the same manner." (Compare with this language the language of the same Justice, dissenting,
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmanm, 285 U. S. 262, 310, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 386 (1932). Although
the case arose under the commerce clause, it holds that the requirement of such certificates is
not a highway regulation, as it would not have been objectionable, if it hadc been a highway
regulation.
'Frost and Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 6o5
(1926).

' New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, supra note 6.

'Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 466 (I927).
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By logical extension it has also been held that where a statute leaves to the
executive committee the discretion to determine who shall participate in the primary, and the committee excludes the negro, it is an exclusion by a delegate of
state power and so unconstitutional.2 The instant case, involving no express
delegation by statute, is the inevitable answer to these decisions, and brings
squarely before the federal courts a problem they have carefully avoided. 3 Has
the primary and the officials who conduct it become by statutory regulation such
an integral part of the state election machinery as to be restrained by the constitutional limitations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments? Although,
in a field of divided opinion, 4 the better view would seem to be that for the
purposes of constitutional restraint the concept of an "election" in Texas includes the primary,5 yet we still must find that what practically amounts to
complete disfranchisement of the negro 6 was accomplished by a state agent and
not by a private association. In attempting to solve the problem, we find it
already established that where a statute sets up a group to administer valid public
interests, but one which exercises its discretion to discriminate against a certain
race, the statutes permitting it are unconstitutional.7 In applying this to the
instant case, we find that the constitution, powers and duties of the Texas executive committee are provided for by statute." Moreover, it has even been held
that the committee has no power to impose new restrictions as to who shall vote
in the primary, on the ground that the matter is exclusively within the hands of
the state." Add to these considerations the facts that state statutes provide for
2West v. Bliley, 33 F. (2d) 177 (E. D. Va. 1929) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S.73, 52
Sup. Ct. 484 (1932). In the latter case, to the argument that the party had an inherent right
to determine its membership, Cardozo, J., answered that whatever the rights were they were
vested in the party sovereign, the convention, while the committee was justified by statute
only' The case of Nixon v. Herndon, supra note I,was presented
to the Court as a violation
of the i5th Amendment; although the Court refused to decide whether a primary was included
in the terms of that Amendment, its holding that a state could not deny the right to vote in
a primary becausei of race or color is essentially the same thing. Again in Nixon v. Condon, supra note 2, at 84, 52 Sup. Ct. at 485, the Court says: "Whether the effect of Texas
legislation has been to work so complete a transformation of the concept of a political party
as a voluntary association, we do not now decide."
'It would seem that the slight majority of decisions consider the primary included within
the terms "elections" as used by statutes and constitutions. Note (930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 262,
265 et seq. The contrary opinion of Sargent, Law of Primary Elections (1918) 2 MiNN. L.
REv.97, is based on a consideration of too few cases.
'Texas has twice repudiated the applicability to their statutory nominating procedure of
decisions holding that "elections" do not include primaries. Ashford v. Goodwin, 3O3 Tex.
491, 13 S.W. 535 (191o) ; Anderson v. Ashe, 62 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 130 S. W. IO44 (090).
In the latter case, the court said at 266, 330 S.W. at 3O46, "The contest of a primary election
held under the present statutes of this state authorizing and governing such elections is in no
sense more of a political or non-judicial question than the contest of a general election... .
The basis of several decisions has been that if a statute applying to elections would be practically impotent unless also applied to primaries, then it will be held to extend to them. For
example, it would be futile to have an election free from fraud if the primaries were fraudulent. Leonard v. Comm., 112 Pa. 607, 4 Atl. 220 (1886) ; Comm. v. Willcox, iii Va. 849,

859, 69 S. E. 1027, 1031 (1911) ; State v. Hirsch, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. io62 (I87O).

On

this theory, of what effect are prohibitions against race discrimination in elections if they do
not apply to the primary. That as expressed by the 14th Amendment they do apply, see
supra note 3.
6The only important public primary in Texas is that of the Democratic Party which
therefore decides the election; the negro's attempt to form his own party would undoubtedly
result in race riots and mob terrorism.
'Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 3o64 (1885) where permits to operate
laundries had to be obtained from a board which elected to deny them to Chinese.
'TEx.Rav. Civ. CODE (Vernon, 1928) arts. II8,.1164.
'Briscoe v. Boyle, 286 S.W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) in which the court said at 276,
. by legislating upon the subject of the character and degree of party' fealty required
of voters participating in such elections, the Legislature has assumed control of that subject
to the exclusion of party action, thus depriving the party of any power to alter, restrict or
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the qualifications of the primary election judges who would exclude under the
instant resolution, specify their assistants, the manner in which they are to be
paid, their specific duties, the kind of ballots they may use, the oaths they should
administer, and provides them with voting machines at state expense; it would
then seem quite possible to hold that the exclusion of the negro from the primary
in the instant case was by a delegate of state power, and that the statutes permitting such unlawful discrimination are unconstitutional. 10

CORPORATIONS-INsOLVENCY-PowER

OF

INSOLVENT

CORPORATION

TO

PREFER AN OFFICER-CREDITOR-In accordance with an agreement entered into in

1923,1 at the time of negotiating a loan, the insolvent corporation in 193o executed to the defendant corporation, at its demand, a mortgage on all its assets
as security for the sums previously loaned. In 193o the insolvent corporation
was actually insolvent. The president of the insolvent corporation owned substantially all the shares of the defendant corporation and the two directorates
were identical. Plaintiffs, receivers to dissolve the insolvent corporation at the
request of judgment creditors whose judgments were entered after the date of
the mortgage, sued to have the mortgage set aside. Held,' that the mortgage was
valid. Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 163 At. 480 (Md. 1932).
The court properly treated the case as one of preferment of an officer."
Stating that the attack on the conveyance, not having been made within the statutory period during which all preferences could be set aside, 4 would succeed
only if it could be shown that the mortgage was a "fraudulent conveyance", 5 or
tainted with "fraud in fact", 6 the court held it not to be a fraudulent conveyance,
enlarge the test of the right of the voter tq participate in party primaries." On this basis,
the committee action in the instant case would seem to be invalid. Cf. Gilmore v. Waples,
io8 Tex.167, 188 S. W. 1037 (1916).
" TEX. REv. CIV. CODE (Vernon,1928) arts. 3104, 3108, 3105, 31o9, 3117, 3o96, and 2997a,
sec. 6; cf. id. arts. 3102, 3103, 317o, and 3133. One of the facts in the instant case was that
the city could pay for the primary, although as to the significance of this see Note (1930)
I5 Coa. L. Q. at 267. Also, although party officials are not governmental officials, People
v. Cahill, 188 N. Y. 489, 81 N. E. 453 (19o7), the party has no power to exclude voters from
the primary by rules that demand more than the legal qualifications, Brown v. Cole, lO5 N. Y.
Supp. 196 (Sup.Ct. 19o7).
Cardozo, J., in Nixon v. Condon, supra note 2, at 88, 52 Sup. Ct. at 487, has described
the problem as one of functional approach in these terms: "The test is not whether the members of the executive committee are the representatives of the State in the strict sense in
which an agent is the representative of his principal. The test is whether they are to be
classified as representatives of the state to such an extent and in such a sense that the great
restraints of the Constitution set limits to their action."
'By the agreement the defendant corporation agreed to furnish the insolvent corporation
"with such sums of money and at such times as I [the president of the defendant corporation
and its principal shareholder who was also an officer of the insolvent corporation] may deem
necessary for the carrying on of the business of the insolvent corporation" and the insolvent
corporation undertook to execute, on demand, mortgages pledging any of its property which
the president deemed adequate to secure such loans.
One judge dissenting and one concurring in an opinion in which he found the corporation was not insolvent at the time of the execution of the mortgage.
' The present is a case where the application of the practice of "piercing the veil of corporate entity" is customary, and the court properly identified the president-shareholder with
his alter ego, the defendant corporation. See Wolmsm, THE DIsRaEAnn OF TE CORPORATE
FICTION (1927) 29.

' Under the provisions of MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 94 and art. 47, § 114,
preferences by insolvent corporations may be set aside only within four months after the conveyances are recorded.
'By this term the writer has defined conveyances in violation of the statute of 13 ELiz.,
(1571) c. .5which in Maryland is codified in MD.ANN. CODE: (Bagby, 1924) art. 39B.
' This term is used in the principal case at 484. It is expanded to "an actual' fraud as
denounced upon equitable principles" in the principal case at 489.
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and declared that "the mere fact that the preference was to an officer of the
corporation" was insufficient evidence from which to infer fraud in fact. Opinion
is divided as to whether an insolvent corporation may prefer its officers to the
same extent as other creditors. The text writers speak of three views.7 The
majority hold that such preferences are illegal and may be set aside.8 At least
two states say that they are permissible only if the preferred officer can show
that they are "fair and equitable". 9 Others, including this court, say such preferences are unimpeachable, 10 in absence of fraud.." It is reasonably clear that
to be at all meaningful "fraud" as used in the latter decisions must differ in
meaning from "fraudulent conveyance". It is also certain that the facts before
this court showed more than a "mere" preference of an officer.' 2 If the present
factual situation cannot support an inference of fraud, what situation can? There
is no case which answers this question and a possibility is raised that the courts
allowing preferment mean to permit these preferences without question. If that
is their intention would it not be preferable to omit the qualification of "fraud"
from the categorical statement of the rule of permissibility under which they
purport to decide the case?

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INTERSTATE RENDITION-STATUS Op ACCUSED AS
"FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE" WHEN REMOVED FROM A STATE BY FEDERAL
AUTHORITIES-Relator was indicted in Illinois for an offense committed there.

Before trial, he was convicted of a federal offense and taken to Kansas by the
federal authorities. While serving his sentence there, he was removed to Illinois
and convicted of the state offense. He was then returned to the federal prison,
and, upon his subsequent discharge in Kansas, was arrested there upon a requisition from Illinois. He was discharged by the Kansas court on the ground that
he was not a fugitive from justice. After going to Minnesota he was again
arrested at the request of Illinois and sued out a writ of habeas corpus. Held,
that he was a fugitive from justice and could be rendered up to Illinois. State,
ex rel., Shapiro v. Wall, 244 N. W. 811 (Minn. 1932).
Interstate rendition is regulated by the Federal Constitution' and act of
Congress,' and by statute in some states.' In the main, two things are necessary
before one state can render up a person to another. First, such person must
78 TiOMPsoN, CORPORATIONS

(3d ed. 1927) § 6151 et seq.; 8 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF

CORPORATIONs (1919) § 5144 et seq.
For an exhaustive citation of cases see 8 THOmPSON, op. cit. smpra note 2, at 261n.
State v. Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co., 149 Mo. 181, 50 S. W. 321 (1899); and see
Mueller v. Monongahela Fire Clay Co., 183 Pa. 540, 38 Atl. lO9 (1898).
l°
These cases are collected at 8 THompsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 266n; 8 FLETCHER,
op. cit. supra note 2,at 8767n.
'This particular qualification is added to the rule enunciated in the following cases:
Smith v. Skeary, 47 Conn. 47, 54 (1879) ; Garrett v. Burlington Plow Co., 70 Iowa 697, 7o2,
29 N. W. 395, 398 (1886); Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737, 740 (1884).
I As before the court, the method of doing business used by these corporations was quite
evidently one popular in real estate offices as a means of restricting mortgage creditors to
whatever liens their mortgages give them and leaving them without remedy to collect their
deficiency judgments. The mere fact that the defendant corporation never demanded its
mortgage until the creditor's judgment threatened shows the purpose of the provision.
Whether or not such a schemd of doing business is fraudulent "in fact" is for the court to
decide, but it certainly is open to ethical objections.
'UNITED STATES CONSTrUTION, Art. 4, § 2 (2).
aI STAT. 302 (1793), i8 U. S. C. § 662 (1927).
'Eight states have adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 9 U. L. A. (1932)
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be charged with crime in the demanding state,4 and, second, he must be a
"fugitive from the justice" of that state.5 The latter of these requirements has
been the subject of much controversy. A sharp distinction should be drawn
between cases where the accused leaves the state (voluntarily), and where he is
taken out of the state by force, usually under custody, or is coerced into going
(involuntarily). It is well settled that when he leaves the state voluntarily his
motive in going is immaterial, 6 as are the circumstances under which he left.7
In the situation where he goes involuntarily, there is less uniformity in the decisions. It has been held that where some form of coercion has forced him to go
out of the state, as where he left to escape mob violence," or because he was told
to leave by the authorities, " he was, nevertheless, a fugitive from justice. On
the other hand, where the accused was elected to Congress and sent to Washington by the people of his state, he was not a fugitive. 10 In accord with the
principal case, it has been held that when one is removed from a state by the
federal authorities he is a fugitive." One case has reached an opposite result
where be was previously given up by the demanding state to a sister state.12 It
is evident that the courts treat the problem as though the Constitution merely
lays down a general principle or plan, leaving it to the courts to carry out this
general idea. Therefore, feeling that the Constitution should not be construed
so as to permit a person accused of crime to find an asylum in another state, 8
'The question of whether the relator in the principal case was "charged with crime"
was not raised. It has often been contended that one convicted of a crime is no longer
"charged" with that crime, because, it is said, the charge is merged in the conviction. This
contention has been generally repudiated; the courts hold that the term is used in its broad
sense in the Constitution and federal statute, including all persons. accused of crime by legal
proceedings, the charge continuing until the person has been tried and acquitted, or, if convicted, until the sentence has been served. Hughes v. Pflanz, I39 Fed. 98, (C. C. A. 6th,
19o5) ; Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441, 36 Atl. 83o (1896) ; Matter of Hope, 7 N. Y. Cr.
4o6, IO N. Y. Supp. 28 (1889). As a matter of.public policy, this result seems proper, in
view of the fact that, otherwise, once convicted of a crime a person could find a safe asylum
in any other state unless he could be charged with a new crime.
'Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 8o, 6 Sup. Ct. 291 (1885) ; EX parte Reggle, 114 U. S. 642,
5 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1885) ; In re Tod, 12 S. D. 386, 81 N. W. 637 (19oo).
" Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 415, and authorities there cited.
7Reed
v. United States, 224 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) ; Bassing v. Cady, 2o8 U. S.
386, 28 Sup. Ct. 392 (19o8) ; Note (914) 51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 668.
'Glass v. Becker, 25 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 9th, jI928).
'Drinkall v. Spiegel, supra note 5; Hutchings v. Mallon, 218 App. Div. 461, 218 N. Y.
Supp. 432 (1926).

Senator Patterson's Case, reported in 2 MooRE, EXTRADITION AND INTERsTATE RENDITION (1891) § 569.
I Ex parte Cohen, 146 Atl. 423 (N. J. Eq. 1928) ; Hart v. Mangum, 146 Ga. 497, 91 S. E.
543 (1917) ; see American Surety Co. v. Benham, 71 Misc. 345, 355, 128 N. Y. Supp. 61o, 617

(IgnI).

' In re Whittington 34 Cal. App. 344, 167 Pac. 404 (1917). Here the relator was indicted in Texas. Before trial he was rendered up to California and taken to the latter state
by its officers. Later Texas applied for his rendition and it was refused on the grounds that
he was not a fugitive, having left the state involuntarily, and because Texas had waived its
jurisdiction by voluntarily giving him up. A distinction between this case and the situation
in the principal case has been attempted on the ground that, in the former, because the demanding state previously gave up the accused voluntarily it has waived its jurisdiction over
him, while, under facts like those in the principal case, there is no such waiver (1929) 29
COL. L. REV. 1157, at 1158. The difficulty with such a distinction is that nowhere can any
authority be found, in either the State or Federal Constitutions, permitting the governor to
waive the jurisdiction of the state courts over crimes. In fact, in Texas itself, it has been
held that there is no such power. Ex parte Hobbs, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 312, 22 S. W. 1035
(1893); Ex parte McDaniel, 76 Tex. Cr. App. 184, 173 S. W. 1o18 (1915).

Other courts,

however, have held that the power exists. Gallagher v. Hagen, 34 Misc. 85, 69 N. Y. Supp.
475 (1gol) ; see Ex parte Youstler, 268 Pac. 323, 324 (Okla. 1928) ; In re Hess, 5 Kan. App.

763, 771, 48 Pac. 596, 598 (1897).
'Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U. S. 128, 38 Sup. Ct. 41 (1917) ; Gellis v.
Sheriff of Westchester County, 225 App. Div. 156, 232 N. Y. Supp. 217 (1929); Drinkall v.
Spiegel, supra note 5; MooRE EXTRADITION AND INIERsTATE RENDiTION (i8gi) § 578.
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the courts, as the court does in the principal case, stretch the "fugitive from
justice" provision in order to reach the desired result.

FUTURE INTERESTS-CORPORATIONs-APPoRTIoNMENT OF DIVIDENDS OF
CORPORATE SHARES BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN-Testator

bequeathed shares in building corporation in trust for life, remainder over. During the term of the life tenancy, the corporation appropriated part of the surplus
for depreciation reserve.' Upon the winding up of the corporation, the corporate assets sold for an amount greatly in excess 2 of their original cost, and consequently, in addition to other liquidation dividends, the trustee of the estate
received a pro rata share of the depreciation reserve fund. The suit was to determine the respective rights of the life tenant and remainderman thereto. Held,
that there being in fact no depreciation, the fund never lost its identity as income,
and belonged to the life tenant. In re Matthews, 245 N. W. 122 (Wis. 1932).
Problems such as that raised in the principal case must be resolved by a judicial distinction between principal and income. Especially in the field of corporate shares, the guiding principle that a life tenant is entitled to all income
arising from the corpus of the trust during the period of his tenancy, and the
remainderman to the corpus itself and appreciation thereof at the expiration of
the tenancy, 3 becomes difficult of application. Inconsistencies and conflicts in
the technique of courts in dealing with situations of this nature are expectable
in view of the fact that even a theoretical distinction between earnings and capital, if not impossible, would certainly be problematical and indistinct.4 But
purely philosophic speculation as to the inherent character of income as a concept must be subordinate to the practical consideration of what the courts in particular situations have declared it to be.5 A fundamental difference in their
emphasis is apparent: some, in regarding the form of the dividend as determinative of its character, others, its source. So, under the former view, all dividends
payable in cash are declared to be income, and those payable in shares, principal; 6
under the latter view, such arbitrary tests are not controlling: the corporate
books must be examined to determine the origin.7 Abstruse accounting is sometimes required in allocating proceeds to earnings or capital,' and much hos' Such appropriation was found to be a reasonable accounting practice. The remainderman has a right to have the corpus of the estate preserved. Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449,
132

Atl.

352 (1926).

The original cost of the capital was ;25o,ooo; the selling price upon liquidation, $1,300,ooo. The business of the corporation was the rental of a building it owned.
I It must be borne in mind, however, that the intention of the testator is usually controlling, and all rules as to apportionment are merely laws of presumption. Astute draftsmanship of wills would often, eliminate such problems that are raised in the principal case.
See Note (1931) 23 CoL L. REy. 369.
'See, for instance, the differences of opinion in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 4o
Sup. Ct. 189 (192o).
All ordinary current dividends payable within the term belong to the life tenant. Anderson v. Bean, 300 Ill. 2o8, 172 N. E. 47 (1930). The problem is largely one of extraordinary
dividends. Determination of what extraordinary dividends are must rest on the facts of each
2

case.

'The "Massachusetts rule". Minot v. Paine, 98 Mass. 1o (1868). The tendency of
72 A. L. R. 981, 984. The
the jurisdictions appears to be toward this rule. See Note (i3i)
Uniform Principal and Income Act adopts the Massachusetts rule. HANDBOOIK OF THIE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COIuSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1931)

326; Note

(1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 118.
'The "Pennsylvania" or "American rule", followed in the majority of states. Earp's
Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857). The tile at which an extraordinary dividend is payable is immaterial. Goodwin v. McGaughy et al., 1O8 Minn. 248, 122 N. W. 6 (io9).
'See, for example, Dickinson's Estate, 285 Pa. 449, 132 Atl. 352 (1926); Note (1926)
74 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 618.
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tile criticism has been directed against the latter rule because of its alleged
costliness and impracticability. 9 But there is much to recommend it on the
grounds of fairness, 10 however expedient a more arbitrary method may sometimes appear. In a precise situation such as that in the present case, where the
source of the fund was readily determinable, its desirability is patent. 1

STOCKBROKERS-CONvERSION-RIGHT OF ACTION FOR PURCHASE PRICE-

A stockbroker wrongfully repledged certain stock bought and held for a customer. The broker then sued for the purchase price and the conversion was set
up as a complete defense. Held, that the broker could recover the purchase
price less any damage resulting to the customer from the rehypothecation. Otis
v. Medoff (Pa. Supreme Ct., Jan. Term 1932, no. 237).
The instant case expressly overruled four previous Pennsylvania decisions'
holding that a broker who wrongfully repledged stock could not sue for the
purchase price.2 A corollary to the rule permitted the customer in every case
to recover any payment or margin advances he had made. 3 If subsequent to
purchase the stock increased in value no injustice resulted from these previous
principles. In such a situation the customer would naturally sue; and, while
the broker had no counterclaim for the purchase price, the extent of the customer's damages was limited to the increment in the value of the stock plus any
payments made on account.4 But suppose that the stock was bought at $ioo,
was converted at $io, and remained at that price. Under the old view the
broker lost $90 even though that loss had accrued before he committed any
wrongful act. He had no claim whatsoever against the customer, and if the
latter had paid in advance he could recover his payments back. The new view
was designed to meet this type of situation and permits the broker to recoup the
$90 from the customer. The only possible argument against such a result would
be the desirability of imposing a penalty on the broker as a deterrent. The
difficulty with this is that in many cases the loss will fall on the broker's creditors
in bankruptcy and not the broker.5 At the same time the preventitive is not
so essential since the conversion is also a criminal offense.6 In connection with
9
A recent opinion oSf the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia is illustrative. Waterhouse's
Estate, 16 D. & C. 73 (Pa. 1932).
" In view of the fact that many large corporations declare regular stock dividends
greatly in excess of their cash dividends, the Pennsylvania view is a more realistic attitude.
See Note (1932) 46 HIv. L. Rxv. 298.
1 In difficult cases where there is doubt, the application of the rule is in Pennsylvania restricted by the holding in Nirdlinger's Estate, which puts the burden of proof upon the life
tenant to establish the quantum of the proceeds which represents earnings upon liquidation
See thereoA: Note (1928)
of assets. Nirdlinger's Estate, 29o Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 2oo (1927).
76 U. OF P. L. REv. 589; Note (1928) 26 MicH. L. REv. 555.

1Berberich's Estate, 257 Pa. I8I, lO Atl. 461 (1917); Sterling's Estate, 254 Pa. 155,
98 Atl. 771 (gi6) ; Darr v. Fidelity T. & T., 243 Pa. 591, 9o AtI. 368 (1914) ; Sproul v.
Sloan. 241 Pa. 284. 88 Ati. .oI (1912).
2 The theory of the old view was that the safe-keeping and tender of the stock were
conditions precedent to the customer's obligation to pay. See Sproul v. Sloan, supra note I,
at 288, 88 Atl. at 5o2. The decided majority view adopted in the instant case splits up the
transaction into two parts: a purchase transaction and a secondary loan agreement. The
purchase of the stock completes the first transaction and the customer's obligation to pay
arises at that time. See Meyer v. Beveridge, 141 N. Y. 399, 403, 36 N. E. 404 (1894);
Capron v. Thompson, 86 N. Y. 418, 420 (1881).
IShiel v. Stoneham. 77 Misc. i25, 13.q N. Y. Supp. io24 (I912).
'The result under the modern view is the same. The customer recovers the full value of
subject to a counterclaim for the purchase price.
the stock
5
0 E. g., Sproul v. Sloan, supra note'i.
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. IS, § 2486; cf. N. Y. PENAL LAW (1913) § 956.
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this problem the case of Gernis v. Kay' and a 1929 statute" following it are
important. They limited the amount of a customer's damage where the stock
has increased in value and he sues for conversion to the highest price reached
by the stock within a reasonable time after he learned of the wrong. The prior
decisions 9 had generally permitted a recovery based on the highest price to the
date of trial. In other words a duty was imposed on the customer to mitigate
damages. The reason was obviously to avoid penalizing the broker, and is thus
a recognition of the basic policy underlying the instant case.

TAXATION-GIFT TAX-TRUSTS--TERMINATION OF POWER TO REVOKE
TRUST AS CONSTITUTING TRANSFER BY GIFT OF TRUST PROPERTY--In 1917,

respondent conveyed property to trustees for the benefit of his children under
trust indentures in which he reserved to himself the power of revocation. The
Revenue Act of 1924 imposed a tax upon "transfers by gift of any property".1
Subsequently, in 1925, the donor cancelled and surrendered his rights of revocation. Held, (reversing the Circuit Court of Appeals) 2 that such surrender
effected at that time a transfer subject to gift tax. Burnet, Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Guggenheim, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933).
It is a general rule that the reservation of a power of revocation in no way
invalidates a trust; 3 and therefore, in the instant case, both legal and equitable
title to the trust securities was transferred in 1917. But the retention of the
power accompanying the physical delivery prevented a valid gift. 4 When the gift
did become complete in 1925, there was no transfer of property in respect to
title. The power to revoke is not a property right 5 nor was there any purported
recipient of it.6 The transfer of property by gift to be taxable must have
occurred subsequent to the effective date of the Act in 1924.1 The changes in
legal relations of either date were within the taxing power of Congress,8 there294 Pa. 518, 144 Atl. 529 (1928). The case adopted the rule stated in the text but
limited its aDplication to cases of "innocent" conversion.
8
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 68, § 481. The Act provides: "The damages shall
be limited to the difference between the proceeds of the conversion . . .. and such higher
value as the property may have reached within a reasonable time after he had notice of the
conversion." This is a codification of the general common law rule. See MEYm, STOCKBROKERS AND STocK EXCH[ANGES (1931) 554. The statute is reasonably clear, but an interesting problem arises where the stock fluctuates subsequent to conversion as to whether the
customer is limited to the highest price after he learns of the wrongful act. It was so held
under the common law rule in It re Salmon Weed &Co., 53 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
' Learock v. Paxson, 208 Pa. 6o2, 57 Atl. lO97 (19o4) ; Bank v. Reese, 26 Pa. 143 (i856).
"For the calendar year 1924 and each calendar year thereafter . . . a tax . . . is
hereby imposed upon the transfer by a resident by gift during such calendar year of
any property wherever situated, whether made directly or indirectly," 43 STAT. 253, 313
(1924). This act has been repealed and the termination of a power of revocation expressly
taxed as a gift. 47 STAT. 245 (1932) 26 U. S. C. SuP-. VI, § 550c (1932).
-58 F. (2d) 188 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
'It re Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924) ; cf. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT
(Am. L. INST. 1930) § 64.
" See Basket v. Hassell, 1O7 U. S. 6o2, 2 Sup. Ct. 415 (1882).
'Jones v. Clifton, ioi U. S. a25 (1879) ; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858);
In re Dolan's Estate, supra note 2.
'A surrender of a similar right has been aptly treated as an extinguishment. In re Hall's
Estate, 99 N. J. L. 1, 125 At. 246 (1923).
The gift tax is constitutional as an excise tax, Broomley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124,
50 Sup. Ct. 46 (124) ; Note (I932) 32 Cor L. REv. lO43; but its retroactive sections are
invalid, Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105 (927) ; Untermyer v. Anderson,
440,
0. 48 Sup. Ct. 353 (1928).
276 U.
8See: Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 26o, 48 Sup. Ct. 225 (1928) ; Chase National
Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126 (1929) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S.
376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (193o) ; Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356 (193o).
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fore the question was one of legislative intent. The foregoing premises were
coincident in the opinions of both the Supreme Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals in the instant case. The latter court, applying the rule of construction
that in case of doubt tax statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the
taxpayer,9 and observing that in another section of the Revenue Act, where the
power of revocation was taxed, it was expressly so stated, 0 held that Congress
intended to tax the gratuitous transfer of legal title. In accord with this holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals are numerous decisions of state courts that
the termination by death of a power of revocation does not effect a transfer subject to inheritance tax." The Supreme Court in arriving at the opposite result
treated the rule that requires interpretation favoring the taxpayer as referring,
not to the party to the suit alone, but taxpayers in general, who would in no
way be favored by an immediate tax upon the creation of such trusts. Rather2
the former construction would create a hardship, which is always to be avoidedy,
in that the donee would take the property subject to a lien for taxes,' 3 and yet
would have no assurance that he would ever receive the principal. The Supreme
Court pointed out that by the estate tax, trust property subject to the power
of revocation in the settlor is taxed as part of the settlor's estate,'4 and since
the estate tax provisions and those of gift are in the same Act and upon the same
subject they should be construed together. Furthermore, "transfer" has come
to be identified more nearly with change of economic benefits than with technicalities of title.' 5 The "transfer by gift of property" was therefore intended
to apply to the yielding of dominion, such as settlor's surrender of 1925. This
view is in accord with Federal decisions on analagous questions," and taxes the
actual passing of value from the donor to the donee."
TAxATIoN-INCOME TAX-REPURCHASE AT LESS THAN PAR OF CORPORATE BONDS DISTRIBUTED AS DIVIDENDS-The assets of the defendant corpora-

tion having appreciated, it distributed part of the increase to its stockholders as
a dividend, by issuing to them its own debenture bonds. The corporation subsequently purchased some of these bonds at less than their face value. Held,
that this difference was not taxable income.' Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).

'Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 Sup. Ct. 53 (1917) ; U. S. v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179,
44 Sup. Ct. 69 (1923) ; Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55, 51 Sup. Ct. 49 (1930).
"043 STAT. 304 (924), 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. SuP'. VI, §411 (1932).
IPeople v. Northern Trust Co., 289 Ill. 475, 124 N. E. 662 (1919) ; Matter of Masury,
28 App. Div. 580 (N. Y. 1898) ; In re Bower's Estate, 231 N. Y. 613, 132 N. E. 91o (1921).
See Matter of Miller, 236 N. Y. 290, 14o N. E. 701 (1923).
"Hawaii v. Mankichi, 19o U. S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 787 (19o3) ; Sorrell v. United States,
53 Sup. Ct. 210 (I933).
" While the tax upon the value must be paid by the donor, it constitutes a lien upon the
property transferred. 43 STAT. 316 (1924). Under the act now in force, the personal liability for payment extends to the donee. 47 STAT. 249 (1932), 26 U. S. C. Sui'. VI, § 559
(1932).
"Supra note IO.
International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 47 Sup. Ct. 19 (1926) ; cf.
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, I59 (1918) ; Gooch v. Oregon Short
Line Co., 258 U. S. 22, 24, 42 Sup. Ct. 192, 193 (1922).
. ..
taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." Holmes, J.,
in Corliss v. Bowers, supra note 7, at 378, 50 Sup. Ct. at 336.
"' Saltonstall v. Saltonstall; Chase National Bank v. United States; Corliss v. Bowers,
all supranote 7; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929).
I The same result as in the instant case was reached by the Court of Claims, Means v.
United States, 69 Ct. of Cl. 539, 39 F. (2d) 748 (193o).
' "The term 'gross income' includes . . . gains or profits and income derived from any
source whatever." 44 STAT. 23 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 954 (1928). U. S. Treas. Reg. 69,
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In Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.,2 the Supreme Court applied the accepted definition of taxable income, i. e., the gain derived from capital, from
labor, or from both combined, or from the sale or conversion of capital assets,'
and apparently held that the gain realized from payment of a debt in depreciated
currency was not taxable income. However, in United States v. Kirby Lninber
Co., the court held that a taxable gain was realized when a corporation purchased its own bonds at a price lower than that at which they had been issued
to the public.4 Although the Bowers case was there distinguished on the ground
that in that case the entire transaction was a loss (the borrowed money having
been lost in the business), it seems that the Kirby case was really a new departure, since it abandoned judicial definitions and adopted the "popular meaning"
of income. 5 The instant decision does not conflict with the Kirby case. There,
the sale of bonds increased the corporation's cash assets, the increase being offset by the bonds. When the bonds were repurchased at less than par, the entire
liability was wiped out, but part of the original increase in assets remained,
which was clearly a net gain in assefs. But in the principal case, no net gain
was realized. Appreciation of value of assets is not taxable as income until the
increase is realized by sale or otherwise. 6 By writing up the book value of its
assets, the corporation acquired nothing that it had not owned before, although
it increased its surplus account. By distributing the surplus in the form of bonds,
the corporation obviously gained nothing; and by retiring the bonds at a price
below par, although the corporation paid a smaller dividend than it had expected
to pay, it gained nothing,7 for it would not have gained anything if it had originally declared a smaller dividend, or no dividend at all. The court could have
easily reached the same result by applying the definition of income used in the
Bowers case. Its failure to do so signifies a continuation of the recent tendency
Art. 545 I) (c)provides, "If, however, the corporation purchases and retires any of such
bonds [i. e., bonds issued at their face value] at a price less than the issuing price or face

value, the excess of the issuing price or face value over the purchase price is gain or income
for the taxable year."
2271 U. S. 170, 46 Sup. Ct. 449 (1926).
See adverse criticism in (1925) 34 YAxrz L. J.
334; C1925) 25 COL. L. REV. iiO; MoNTGomERY, INCOm TAX PROCEDURE (1928) 328.
'Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 207, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 193 (192o).
In speaking of
this definition in Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U. S. 509, 519, 41 Sup. Ct.

386, 389 (1921) the court says, "In determining the definition of the word 'income' thus arrived at, this court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or
economists and has approved . . . what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution."
'284 U, S. 1,52 Sup. Ct. 4 (193); (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 137. This decision overruled a long line of cases based on a broad interpretation of the Bowers case. Appeal of
Independent Brewing Co., 4 B. T. A. 870 (1926) ; Norfolk So. R. R. v. Com'r. of Int. Rev.,
22 B. T. A. 302 (i93i) ; Coastwise Trans. Corp. v. Com'r. of Int. Rev., 22 B. T. A. 373

(193).

See Note (1932) 20 CALIF. L. REv. 441, 448.
'3Baldwin Locomotive Works v. McCoach, 215 Fed. 967 (E.D. Pa. 1914); Industrial
Trust Co. v. Walsh, 222 Fed. 437 (D. Conn. 1915); Lumber Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Malley,
256 Fed. 383 (D.Mass. 1916) ; KEIN, FFDERAL INcOmE TAXATION (1929) 62.
' This is based on the assumption that the books are kept on a cash basis. If the accrual
system of accounting is used, the result might be different. For example, if the liability for
the bonds is permitted to be deducted from gross income for the year in which the bond dividend is declared, and the bonds are repurchased below par during the following year, the
difference would be taxable income. In Campbell Co. v. Com'r. of Int. Rev., 15 B. T. A.
458, 461, Sternhagen, J.(dissenting) pertinently says, "When a deduction has been enjoyed
upon the assumption that a liability will be met to its full extent and the assumption subsequently proves erroneous, a proper adjustment should be made by way of either restating the
deduction for 192o or treating the amount subsequently remitted as a gain in 192I." The
latter course, which is more practical, was followed in Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Burnet, 50 F. (2d) 342 (App. D. C. 1931). See Note (93') 4o YALE L. J.96o, 963.
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to apply the "popular meaning" to the word "income", discarding the conceptual approach which determines what is taxable income by definitional inclusion
and exclusion.8
TORTS-LIBEL-LIABILITY

OF LOCAL NEWSPAPER FOR PUBLICATION OF

NEWS DISPATCHES ]RECEIVED FROm REPUTABLE NEws-GATHERING ORGANIZATION-Plaintiff sued defendant, a local daily newspaper, for having published
news dispatches containing false statements that plaintiff had been indicted for
illegal possession of liquor. The news, apparently authentic, had been received
from reputable press agencies. Defendant demurred. Held, sustaining the demurrer, that the publication was not libelous per se; that to set up a good cause
of action, the declaration must show wantonness, recklessness or carelessness in
its publication, or be counted upon as a libel per quod. Layne v. Tribune Co.,
U. S. Daily, Feb. 14, 1933, at 2162 (Fla. 1933).

Publication of a statement that one has been indicted for a crime involving
moral turpitude is generally held to be libelous per se I as being tantamount to an
imputation of the commission of such crime.2 That the statement has been copied
from another source 3 or repeated in the exact words 4 is usually no justification,
though the one making the statement bona fide believed it to be true 5 and
named the authority of source.6 Such absolute liability is imposed because the
repetition, unaccompanied by an expression of disbelief, operates as a confirmatory endorsement of the statement. 7 The court recognized the prevalence of this
rule, but reasoned that an exception, based upon a rebuttal of the presumption
of malice 8 since the statement was merely reproduced, was essential to satisfy
the modern need for prompt publication 9 which could not be met if the newspaper had to verify all news reported to it by established news-gathering agencies.' 0 In view of the extensive circulation of newspapers, it seems desirable

"See Note

(1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1072.

'Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend's Admrx., 21 Fla. 431 (1885). Though the courts
generally use the term "libelous per se", the meaning sought to be conveyed is that the statements are defamatory per se. It seems that a libel is always actionable per se. NEWELL,
SLANDER AND LiBEL (4th ed. 1924) 834.
2 Cf. Bailey

v. Kalamazoo Publishing Co., 40 Mich. 251 (1879).

'Hotchkiss v. Oliphant, 2 Hill 510 (N. Y. 1842); see also Sanders v. Times-Picayune
Pub. Co., 168 La. 1125, 123 So. 804 (1929).

'Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Wegner, 182 S. W. 45 (Tex. 1916).

'Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 124 Iowa 707, 1oo N. W. 867 (1904).

Every

repetition of a slanderous statement, though originated by a third person, is nevertheless a
wilful publication for which the repeater is liable. Darling v. Mansfield, 222 Mich. 278, 192
N. W. 595 (1923).

"Kirkland v. Constitutional Pub. Co., 38 Ga. App. 632, 144 S. E. 821 (1928) ; Stevens
v. Hartwell, ui Mete. 542 (Mass. 1846) ; cf. Stuart v. News Publishing Co., 67 N. J. L. 317,
51 Atl. 709 (1902).
" NEwELT, op. cit. supra note i, § 300 e seq. Evans and Wife v. Smith, 5 T. B.

Mon.

363 (Ky. 1827) ; World Pub. Co. v. Mullen, 43 Neb. 126, 61 N. W. ios (1894) ; Peck v.
Tribune Co., 214 U. S. 185, 29 Sup. Ct. 554 (1909). See also Funk v. Beverly, 112 Ind. 19o,
13 N. E. 573 (1887) ; Kenney v. McLaughlin, 5 Gray 3 (Mass. i855).
8 The court here considers malice an essential ingredient of the action.
But see Coleman
v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (19o8) to the effect that malice is merely an absenc of legal excuse, and is significant only in affecting, damages and overcoming! the defense of privilege. It is usually said that malice is conclusively presumed where the statement is defamatory per se.
"'No newspaper could afford to warrant the absolute authenticity of every item of its
news, . . . and continue to discharge with efficiency and promptness the demands of
modern necessity for prompt publicatior, if publication is to be had at all." Davis, C. 3., in
principal case.
" The court goes on to say that the declaration is insufficient unless it alleges fault on the
part of the publisher. But whether a statement is libelous per se or per quod is not determined by the state of mind of the publisher, but by whether the publication is injurious upon
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to hold them strictly liable for the publication of charges against an individual's
private character which turn out to be false.11 The newspaper appears to be
better able to bear the burden of the loss than the person defamed. Liability
might be avoided by refusing to publish any statements likely to be defamatory
per se, or by inserting in the contract with the press agency a clause of indemnity for damages sustained by reason of the libelous character of items furnished
by the agency. Since repetition of a statement libelous per se is the natural and
probable result 12 of the original utterance, especially when impliedly authorized,18
the news-gathering agency would also be liable to the party injured for the publication litigated here; 14 though this does not exonerate the republisher, recovery and satisfaction from the news agency should mitigate the damages in a suit
against the republisher.,
The instant case is significant as being indicative of a
tendency toward relaxation of liability without fault in cases of mere republication, and a return to the early theory that one who heard a slander had a legal
right to repeat it."6

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIABILITY FOR FRIGHT AND CONSEQUENCES

THERE~F-Plaintiff cashier while performing her duties was held up by an
armed bandit. As a result of the shock, plaintiff lost her voice. Held, that the
injury was non-actionable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, because the
harm resulting from the fright did not arise out of or in the course of plaintiff's employment.1 Schuster v. PerrymanElectric Co., 163 Atl. 437 (N. J. Dept.
of Labor, 1932).
The question of liability for fright, common in the law of torts, has arisen
with surprising infrequency under Workmen's Compensation Acts. The few
reported cases make little, if any, allusion to similar tort cases. The latter have
divided themselves into liability for intentional conduct,2 .negligent conduct with
impact,- and negligent conduct without impact.4 Commentators have pointed
out that the real basis of the conflict is not the culpability of the defendant nor
the presence of incidental physical injury but rather the fear of fraudulent recoveries resulting from the difficulty of detecting false claims. It is quite apparent
that considerations of culpability would be missing in compensation cases, since
its face without support of extrinsic matter, and such as will necessarily cause injury.
Briggs v. Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325 (19o8).
' The main purpose of the action for libelous statements where no special damage is
alleged is to vindicate the character of the person defamed, and thereby proclaim to the public the absolute innocence of the party accused. To disallow the action against the local publisher would deprive the plaintiff of this right of vindication. This thought is not so important in this case where the statement was published in Florida, and the plaintiff was domiciled in District of Columbia.
' Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Long, 183 S. W. 42I (Tex. 1916) ; cf. Davis v. Starrett, 97 Me. 568, 55 Atl. 516 (19o3) ; Elms v. Crane, 118 Me. 261, 107 Atl. 852 (,9,9).
' Weston v. Barnicoat, 175 Mass. 454, 56 N. E. 61g (19oo) ; Schoepflin v. Coffey, 162 N.
Y. 12, 56 N. E. 5o2 (19oo).

" Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Wegner, supra note 4.
'Egan v. Dotson, 36 S. D. 459, 155 N. W. 783 (915) ; cf. Arnott v. Standard Ass'n,
57 Conn. 86, 17 AUt. 361 (1888); Edwards v. San Jose Printing & Pub. Co., 99 Cal. 431, 34
Pac. 128 (1893).

" See STAR=lE, SLANDER AND LIBEL (6th ed. I897) 329.
'The commissioner cited as authority two tort cases involving negligent conduct.
'Watson v. Dalts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N. W. lo68 (i9o2) ; Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897]

2

Q. B. 57.
Homans v. Boston Elev. R. Co., i8o Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902)
'Denying recovery: Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897);

Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. lO7, 45 N. E. 354 (I896). Permitting recovery: Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 5o N. W. 1034 (1892) ; Mack v. South Bound R. R.,
52 S. C. 323,29 S. E. 905 (1897).
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recovery is not based on fault. The sole question here, likewise, is the policy
against fostering false claims. This fact has been recognized, but has been given
effect not independently, but in deciding whether the injury was one "arising out
of and in the course of employment". 5 jurisdictions are apparently divided as
to result," but in both Michigan and New Jersey, which seem to deny recovery,
there can be found contrary decisions.7 In view of the fact that scientific knowledge of the nature and effect of fright has increased,8 and that proficiency in detecting false claims has become a requisite in the work of the average compensation medical examiner,9 it would seem that the opposite result would have been
entirely desirable and proper in the principal case.
'This approach suggests those tort cases which discuss the problem in terms of causation. See Bohlen, Injury From Negligence Without Impact (igo2) 41 AM. L. RE. (N. s.)
141. A few of the workmen's compensation cases involving liability for nervous shock are
those where the condition is a result of a physical injury. These are not our concern here.
'England permits recovery. Yates v. South Kirby Collieries, Ltd. [igio] 2 K. B. 538.
So do California and Massachusetts. Reich v. City of Imperial, io N. C. C. A. 479 (Cal.
1914) ; Paolo v. Frankfort General Ins. Co., io N. C. C. A. io47 (Mass. 1913). Michigan
and New Jersey seem to deny recovery. But see infra note 7.
'In Visser v. Michigan Cabinet Co., io N. C. C. A. 1o4. (Mich. 1913), the Michigan
Compensation Board decided against recovery and expressed a desire that the supreme court
settle the question. Nine years later in Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.
W. 400 (1922), the Supreme Court decided in favor of recovery saying that they knew of
no cases on point in any jurisdiction. A similar inconsistency is present in the jurisdiction of
the principal case, New Jersey. In Wilson v. Lake Hopatcong Ice Co., io N. C. C. A. 1o51
(N . J. I915) it was said that there could be recovery for death resulting from fright arising
out of and in the course of employment, but that the proof in this case failed to show that
death was due to fright suffered in the course of employment. The immediate case makes
no mention of this authority.
" Goodrich, Emwtional Disturbance as Legal Damage (1922) 20 Micr. L. REv. 497.

'See

COLm,

MEDIco-LEGAL EXAMINATIONS (2d ed. 1922).

